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CAREY v. MUSLADIN: A
COMMENTARY ON WHAT IS NOT
PREJUDICIAL
CHRISTOPHER DONADIO*

I. INTRODUCTION
In a 9-0 decision,1 the United States Supreme Court refused to
find that a California state court had acted “contrary to, or involved
2
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,”
when that court found that it was not prejudicial for trial audience
members to wear buttons with the image of the defendant’s alleged
murder victim. The Court relied upon the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), and its previous rulings in
Estelle v. Williams3 and Holbrook v. Flynn,4 earlier cases that defined
certain actions as prejudicial to a defendant in a court of law. The
Court found that due to the lack of any Supreme Court ruling related
to the fact pattern in this particular case, it could not find that the
state trial court acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied federal
law.5
In Carey, the Court skirts the issue of whether a trial court
violated federal law concerning prejudice by determining that the
particular law did not exist. Rather than filling the gap with new law,
the Court opts not to formulate new law, despite the fact that the case
brings up several important questions, namely: (1) whether tests such
6
7
as those in Williams and Flynn apply to spectator’s conduct; and, (2)
where to draw the line of spectators’ rights to express their views and
*
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opinions in a court of law. The failure to answer these important
questions may be best explained by the Court’s desire to leave the
question of what constitutes prejudicial conduct to trial court judges,
the senators in the courtroom.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Matthew Musladin was convicted of first-degree murder and three
related offenses in a California state court.8 During his trial, the family
members of the victim wore buttons with the image of the victim in
the courtroom. Counsel for Musladin moved the court to order the
family not to wear the buttons, claiming that they were prejudicial to
9
the defendant. The court denied the motion, finding the buttons did
not prejudice the defendant.10 Musladin appealed his conviction to the
California Court of Appeal claiming that the lower court violated his
Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights by allowing the family to
wear the buttons.11 The Court of Appeal, citing Holbrook v. Flynn,12
noted that Musladin had to show actual or inherent prejudice in order
to succeed on his claim. Instead, the California court concluded that
although the practice of wearing photographs of the victim was to be
discouraged, the wearing of the buttons created no such prejudice in
this case.13
Upon his unsuccessful appeal in the California court system,
Musladin filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in federal
14
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The federal district court
denied habeas relief. However, it granted a certificate of appealability
on the buttons issue to determine if they were prejudicial.15 When the
case reached the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that court
reversed the district court decision and remanded for issuance of the
writ. The Ninth Circuit held that the state court’s ruling “was contrary

8. Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 651.
9. Id. at 652.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
13. Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 652.
14. Id. The statute permits an individual, in custody pursuant to a state court ruling, to file
an application for a writ of habeas corpus if they believe their conviction was the result of the
state court acting contrary to, or unreasonably applying federal law. The statute thus allows one
to have their state court claim reviewed in federal court.
15. Id.
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to clearly established federal law and constituted an unreasonable
16
application of that law.”
The Ninth Circuit based its reasoning on the Supreme Court’s
17
18
decisions in Estelle v. Williams and Holbrook v. Flynn, determining
that these cases provided a clearly established rule of federal law (the
test for inherent prejudice applicable to spectators’ courtroom
19
conduct) that should have been applied to Musladin’s case. The
Ninth Circuit’s decision was appealed, and ultimately the Supreme
Court vacated the ruling of the Ninth Circuit, finding that clear
federal law relating to Musladin’s case did not exist, and thus the
California state courts did not act contrary to, or unreasonably apply,
federal law.20
III. HOLDING
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, which
discussed the evolution of federal law relating to prejudicial practices
in the courtroom.21 The opinion begins by citing the AEPDA:
[A]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
22
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Act clearly states that an application for a writ of habeas
corpus can be granted only if the decision “was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law.”23 As a result, the Court noted the need to evaluate established
federal law dealing with prejudice in the courtroom.
Like the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the Supreme Court opinion cites

16.
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20.
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Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 659–60 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Musladin, 427 F.3d at 657–58.
Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 652 (2006).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Id.
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24
the two major cases dealing with this issue: Estelle v. Williams and
25
Holbrook v. Flynn. In Williams, the Court considered whether a
defendant’s presence in the courtroom while dressed in prison
26
clothing was prejudicial. The Williams Court found that a State
violates the Fourteenth Amendment if it “compel[s] an accused to
stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes.”27
In Flynn, the Court considered whether the sitting of four uniformed
28
state troopers behind the defendant was prejudicial. Unlike in
Williams, the Flynn Court held that the “presence of the troopers was
29
not so inherently prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial.”
The opinion notes that both of these situations were factually
dissimilar from the situation in Musladin’s case. The Court
distinguishes Williams and Flynn on other grounds as well, noting that
the cases dealt with government-sponsored practices, but the situation
in Musladin dealt with the actions of private spectators at trial.30 The
Court acknowledged that it has “never addressed a claim that such
private-actor courtroom conduct was so inherently prejudicial that it
deprived a defendant of a fair trial.”31 The opinion notes that the tests
established by Williams and Flynn to determine the existence of
prejudice at a trial ask whether a given practice furthers an essential
state interest, which “suggests that those cases apply only to state32
sponsored practices.”
As a result of the lack of a clear standard derived from Supreme
Court precedent, the lower courts have diverged in how they handle
the issue of spectators’ conduct. Lower courts have taken four general
approaches to these types of claims for spectators’ conduct: (1) they
33
apply Williams and Flynn; (2) they decline to extend Williams and
34
35
Flynn; (3) they have distinguished Flynn on the facts; and (4) they

24. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
25. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
26. Williams, 425 U.S. at 502.
27. Id. at 512.
28. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 562.
29. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006) (citing Flynn, 475 U.S. at 571).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 654.
33. See Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the wearing of
buttons worn by spectators’ during a trial violated the defendant’s rights under Williams and
Flynn); In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607, 617 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (holding that Flynn applied,
however ribbons worn by spectators did not harm the defendant).
34. See Billings v. Polk, 441 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that Williams does not
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have ruled on spectator-conduct claims without relying on, discussing,
36
or distinguishing Williams or Flynn.
Due to the lack of holdings by the Supreme Court regarding the
prejudicial effect of spectators’ courtroom conduct, and the fact that
no ruling of the Court has held that the tests of Williams and Flynn
must be applied to spectators’ conduct, the majority in Carey held
that “it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonably applied
37
clearly established federal law.’” As a result, the Court vacated the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling, and remanded the case for further proceedings
38
consistent with its opinion.
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter delivered concurring
39
opinions. The concurring opinions pay homage to the various
questions that arose in this case, which the majority failed to answer.
Although these opinions make note of the unanswered questions,
they still do not provide any clarity, and instead state that they should
be answered at another time. As a result, the concurring opinions are
simply used to inform the reader that the court is aware of the various
issues in this case, but is reluctant to deal with them. It can be argued
that the Court’s reluctance is based on its desire to keep power in the
hands of the state courts.
Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion focuses on dictum by Justice
O’Connor in the Williams decision, which stated that “clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” refers
to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of
the time of the relevant state-court decision.”40 Though the Carey
majority agrees with this statement, Justice Stevens does not. Instead,
Justice Stevens believes that inclusion of dicta provides a correct
interpretation of the AEDPA. He explained that when the Court’s
opinions announce a new application of a constitutional principle, any
clearly establish a rule that any article worn in the courtroom violates a defendant’s rights).
35. See Pachl v. Zenon, 929 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (en banc) (noting that
although the wearing of buttons by spectators seemed to meet the Flynn test, when considering
the entire trial it could not be said that the defendant was prejudiced).
36. See Buckner v. State, 714 So.2d 384, 389 (Fla. 1998) (holding without any reference to
Williams and Flynn that the trial judge properly found spectator conduct not to be prejudicial);
State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 30 (Kan. 1998) (holding without any reference to Williams or Flynn
that buttons worn by spectators did not prejudice the defendant).
37. Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 654.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 651.
40. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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explanatory language that is intended to provide guidance to lawyers
41
and judges should be considered, regardless of whether it is dicta.
Justice Stevens’s concurrence was closely aligned with Justice Souter’s
concurrence, discussed below, with one notable exception. Justice
Souter viewed the buttons as a potential First Amendment right,42 but
Justice Stevens argued that there was “no merit whatsoever to the
suggestion that the First Amendment may provide some measure of
protection to spectators in a courtroom who engage in actual or
symbolic speech to express any point of view about an ongoing
43
proceeding.”
Justice Souter drafted a concurring opinion. He explained how the
Court has clearly adopted a federal standard for evaluating
prejudicial behavior in a court of law, and that “it reaches the
44
behavior of spectators.” He cites a history of Supreme Court cases
that defined prejudice in the courtroom as anything open to the
jurors’ courtroom observations that can prejudice a defendant. These
prejudicial observations are contrary to federal law, regardless of
whether the prejudice inheres to the state or a spectator.45 He
espoused the possibility that the buttons worn by a victim’s family
could create an air of prejudice against a defendant, in that an
“expected response [by the jury] could well seem to be a verdict of
46
guilty.” Despite this, he stated that the buttons are only
impermissible if the risk of prejudice reaches an unacceptable level.
Here, Justice Souter provides two reasons why the risk does not
47
reach an unacceptable level. First, several courts have dealt with
similar facts as those in this case, and the majority of them have found
a lack of prejudice.48 Second, there is an interest in protecting the
49
expression of the spectators in a courtroom. Justice Souter does not
go so far as to find First Amendment protection granted to spectators,
41. Id.
42. See id. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[I]n the absence of developed argument it
would be preferable not to decide whether protection of speech could require acceptance of
some risk raised by spectators' buttons.”).
43. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring)
44. Id. at 657 (Souter, J., concurring).
45. Id. The cases cited include Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) and Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
46. Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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stating that “it would be preferable not to decide whether protection
of speech could require acceptance of some risk raised by spectators’
50
buttons.”
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion discusses the importance of
keeping trials free of a coercive or intimidating atmosphere.51 Justice
Kennedy cited several cases, including Frank v. Mangum,52 Moore v.
53
54
Dempsey, and Sheppard v. Maxwell, all of which required “a court,
on either direct or collateral review, to order a new trial when a
defendant shows his conviction has been obtained in a trial tainted by
55
an atmosphere of coercion or intimidation.” The concurrence noted
that if the wearing of buttons created a form of intimidation similar to
that in the aforementioned cases, then relief should be granted,
regardless of whether or not a Supreme Court case dealt directly with
a situation similar to Musladin’s.56 Justice Kennedy’s examination of
the Carey facts, however, determined that the buttons created no type
of coercion or intimidation. His concurrence differed from the
plurality because he believed it was necessary for the Court to
develop a new rule dealing with the situation in Musladin’s case.57
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, makes it clear that the
Court should rule on the factual issue of whether a button with the
image of a victim worn in the courtroom would prejudice a
defendant.58 The majority refuses to rule on that for two possible
reasons, alluded to above. First, the Court defers to trial judges’
discretion to determine whether or not items, such as the buttons, are
prejudicial. Because the trial judges are in the courtroom at the time,
they are the best candidates to determine whether or not a given
practice is prejudicial. As support for this notion, Justice Souter’s

50. Id. Justice Souter noted the possibility that a First Amendment argument could be
made in this situation, but felt it should not come into play with these facts. Justice Stevens
rejected the possibility that a First Amendment argument could be present. Id. at 656.
51. Id. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)
53. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)
54. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)
55. Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 657.
58. Id.
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concurrence notes the importance of the lower court judges’ rulings,
stating his reluctance to find prejudice when the majority of lower59
court judges did not find buttons of this nature to be prejudicial. A
second rationale for the Court’s failure to address the issue is the
Court’s fear of moving towards the development of a laundry list of
prejudicial items, thereby eroding the powers of trial court judges. A
judicial economy argument is at hand. Such a list would likely result
in more petitions to the Court, and the overturning of otherwise valid
convictions.
The second issue the Court fails to resolve is whether the tests for
prejudicing the defendant extend to spectators. Although Justice
Souter directly addressed this issue in his concurring opinion, stating
that “there is no serious question that [the prejudicial test] reaches
the behavior of spectators,”60 the majority does not attempt to resolve
the issue. The majority’s failure to address the matter, other than
pointing to the fact that the Court has never specifically dealt with the
issue, enhanced the idea that federal law on trial prejudice is hazy, and
thus supports the actions of the California state court. By noting that
the Court has not addressed the issue before, and then failing to do so
now, the Court further supports the lack of a clear federal law, and
instead provides that the lower courts should be applying the
standard of law regarding prejudice in the courtroom because it is the
trial judges who can best determine if a courtroom practice or
conduct is prejudicial.
Finally, the Court fails to address whether any rights are violated if
spectators are not allowed to express themselves in a court of law.
Neither the majority opinion nor any of the concurring opinions seek
to provide an answer to this question. The reluctance of the Court to
deal with this First Amendment question is likely due to the
magnitude of the issue. This case did not have anything to do with the
free speech rights of the spectators, and although the Court is allowed
to consider any given issue when ruling on a case, it is more likely that
the Court would want to address this issue when it is the question for
which certiorari is granted.
It is often disappointing when the Supreme Court passes on an
opportunity to establish a bright line rule on a given issue, but there

59. Id. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 657.
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are certain legal issues that simply can not be resolved in that way.
Instead, it is sometimes necessary for the Court to allow rulings to
occur on a case-by-base basis. This is the situation in Carey. Although
the Court could have easily established a bright line rule as to
whether spectators could wear buttons bearing an image of the victim
in the courtroom, because of the competing interest on both sides—
fairness to the defendant and freedom of speech—the Court decided
to defer to the lower courts, and allow them to determine on a caseby-case basis whether a given practice in the trial courtroom is
prejudicial.

